Ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections this coming Sunday, June 7, the country is often portrayed as steadily drifting from Moscow toward the West. Yet the reality is far more complex: despite growing tensions with Russia and deeper engagement with the EU and the United States, Armenia remains deeply intertwined with its longtime partner economically, strategically, and institutionally, writes PhD researcher Leonardo Zanatta.

 Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan on campaign trail, handing out pins in the shape of the country of Armenia — a symbol for his political agenda. Photo: Facebook Nikol Pashinyan

Russia’s military overstretch in Ukraine has not only drained its military and economic resources but also weakened its ability to maintain influence across regions long considered part of its backyard, including the South Caucasus. Nowhere has this erosion been more visible than in the Kremlin’s increasingly strained relationship with Armenia — a formal ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which has refused to join Western economic sanctions against Moscow and hosts a Russian military base in its second-largest city, Gyumri.

The roots of the Russian-Armenian rift lie in the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. When Azerbaijani forces crossed into internationally recognized Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022, Moscow chose not to intervene despite commitments that ostensibly obligated it to do so, prompting Yerevan to question the reliability of its security guarantees. Tensions deepened as the Kremlin became increasingly preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and its ability to uphold the ceasefire it had brokered in 2020 steadily weakened. Russian peacekeepers proved unable to prevent either Azerbaijan's blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022 or the lightning offensive that returned the enclave to Baku's control nine months later.

Leonardo Zanatta

Onderzoeker

Leonardo Zanatta is kenner van de Kaukasus en promovendus in Internationale Betrekkingen aan de Corvinus Universiteit van Boedapest.

A crumbling alliance

As a result of these events, Russia's standing in Armenia suffered a major blow. A March 2024 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 66 percent of Armenians viewed Moscow as a security threat. Yerevan has since reduced its reliance on Russian security guarantees. While it remains formally part of the CSTO, it has suspended its participation in the alliance, boycotted exercises and summits, and halted its financial contributions. Defense cooperation between the two countries has also diminished sharply. Whereas Moscow supplied more than 90 percent of Armenia's arms imports before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, its share has since fallen below 10 percent, with India and France stepping in to fill the gap.

Whereas Moscow supplied more than 90 percent of Armenia's arms imports before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, its share has since fallen below 10 percent, with India and France stepping in to fill the gap

Moreover, Yerevan has moved to scale back Russia's security presence in the country, calling for the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, Zvartnots International Airport, and the Armenia-Iran crossing, while seeking to regain control over some of its critical assets, including the national railway network operated by the Russian-owned South Caucasus Railway.

The Russian-Armenian rift has extended beyond security matters. In February 2024, Armenia officially became a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which had issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. This move theoretically obliges Armenian authorities to detain him should he visit the country. Seven months later, Armenia accused Russia of backing an attempted coup through the 'Arbat' Battalion, whose ranks include Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh veterans who have fought alongside Russian forces in Ukraine. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, dismissed the allegations as groundless.

Yerevan's foreign policy recalibration

Amid tensions with Russia, Pashinyan has moved to broaden Armenia's diplomatic options. To that end, he agreed to transfer four border villages to Azerbaijan in April 2024 as part of an ongoing delimitation process, despite significant domestic backlash. Less than a year later, the two sides announced that they had finalized a draft peace agreement. In August 2025, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Washington, where they initialed a 17-point framework for peace and normalization, including a transit arrangement linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory.

 Pashinyan (R) during the signing ceremony of the framework for peace and normalisation with Azerbaijan in August 2025. Photo: The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Pashinyan has also sought to normalize relations with another longstanding adversary—Turkey. The border between the two countries has remained closed since 1993, largely because of Ankara's support for Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet contacts have expanded steadily since 2020 through special envoys, partial air links, and talks on full normalization. In May, the Turkish government decided to ease restrictions on the transit of goods involving Armenia.

Most troubling from the Kremlin’s perspective, Yerevan has courted greater Western involvement in regional diplomacy. Relations with the United States have expanded markedly, particularly after the signing of a Strategic Partnership Charter in the final days of Joe Biden's presidency. Under Donald Trump, this trajectory continued as Washington emerged as a key stakeholder in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process. Furthermore, visits by Vice President J. D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio in 2026 broadened cooperation into areas such as nuclear energy and advanced technologies while reinforcing Yerevan’s support for US-led regional connectivity initiatives.

Most troubling from the Kremlin’s perspective, Yerevan has courted greater Western involvement in regional diplomacy

Armenia's ties with the European Union have also deepened considerably. The process gained momentum in 2023, when Brussels deployed a civilian monitoring mission along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and Pashinyan addressed the European Parliament, declaring Yerevan’s readiness to deepen ties as far as the EU was willing to go. Since then, Armenia has launched its EU accession process, entered a visa liberalization dialogue with the bloc, and formalized its commitment to closer integration. During a visit to Yerevan in June 2025, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas described bilateral relations as closer than ever before. With the adoption of the EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda, Brussels has committed €500 million in energy investments to help reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, alongside €15 million for resilience-building measures, including efforts to counter Russian disinformation. 

Moscow’s growing unease ahead of Armenian elections

While officially endorsing Armenia's efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Moscow has grown increasingly uneasy about Yerevan's engagement with the West and Pashinyan's attempts to leverage closer ties with the EU ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled in the South Caucasian country for June 7. That unease was on display during two recent events.

The first occasion was April 1, when Pashinyan travelled to Moscow for talks with Putin. The unusually frank public exchange between the two leaders offered a glimpse of the state of their relationship. The Russian president directly addressed Armenia's European aspirations, arguing that EU membership is incompatible with participation in the EAEU and warning that Yerevan would forfeit key benefits, including access to subsidized Russian gas. Pashinyan replied that, while Armenia saw no need to choose between the two for now, any such decision would ultimately rest with the Armenian people.

The Armenian prime minister meets with Russian president Putin on April 1, 2026, in the Kremlin. Photo: The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Putin also made an explicit political statement, urging Armenia’s prime minister to ensure the participation of what he described as 'Russia's friends' in the elections. The remark was widely interpreted as a reference to one of the prime minister's main challengers, Samvel Karapetyan. The Armenian-Russian billionaire and head of the Tashir Group is barred from serving as prime minister under Armenian law because of his multiple citizenships. Since December 2025, he has also been under house arrest on charges of supporting an alleged coup plot involving senior leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Putin also made an explicit political statement, urging Armenia’s prime minister to ensure the participation of what he described as 'Russia's friends' in the elections

Karapetyan has repeatedly accused Pashinyan of pursuing a foreign policy that favors Azerbaijani interests and of showing excessive weakness in negotiations with Baku. Similar criticism has been voiced by the Armenia Alliance, led by former president Robert Kocharyan, and by Prosperous Armenia, headed by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan. Pashinyan, for his part, has frequently portrayed Karapetyan, Kocharyan, and Armenian Apostolic Church leader Karekin II as political proxies of Moscow.

The second occasion was Armenia's hosting of the 8^th European Political Community (EPC) Summit alongside the first-ever EU-Armenia summit in May. The symbolism was hard to miss. The gatherings underscored Western support for Pashinyan ahead of the elections and, for the first time since taking office in 2019, brought Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Armenia. During the summit, Pashinyan stated that Armenia does not consider itself 'Russia's ally' in relation to Ukraine, prompting outrage in Moscow. Days later, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Armenia's ambassador to Moscow.

Pashinyan (L) and French president Macron (R) walk the streets of Yerevan during the EPC summit in the Armenian capital in May. Photo: Facebook Nikol Pashinyan

The limits of the 'Westward Shift' narrative

As Armenians head to the polls amid ongoing tensions with Moscow, many observers in the West view the elections as a decisive test for the country's geopolitical orientation. Within this framing, Pashinyan emerges as a genuine pro-Western reformer committed to bringing Armenia closer to the EU, though the country's deep-rooted dependence on Russia, a legacy of previous administrations, continues to limit his room for maneuver. Therefore, his reelection would continue Armenia's gradual drift away from Moscow. This sentiment was echoed at the EPC summit by one of its main architects, French President Emmanuel Macron, who remarked: 'Let’s be honest: eight years ago, no one would have come here. Eight years ago, this country was considered a de facto satellite of Russia.'  

'Let’s be honest: eight years ago, no one would have come here. Eight years ago, this country was considered a de facto satellite of Russia'  

Beyond underestimating the extent to which Armenia and Russia remain interconnected economically, strategically, and institutionally, this 'geopolitical choice' narrative overlooks two questions at the heart of Russian-Armenian relations. Is Pashinyan really committed to pulling Armenia out of Russia's orbit? And does the Kremlin truly want to see him lose?

It is misleading to argue, as Macron appeared to imply, that tensions between Russia and Armenia began with Pashinyan's rise to power in 2018. While the Velvet Revolution dismantled political and economic networks tied to former leaders Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, it did not seek a geopolitical rupture with Moscow. Just days after taking office, Pashinyan travelled to Russia, where he praised Moscow's 'balanced position' during the Armenian elections and described bilateral relations as 'allied' and 'strategic.'

Nor did his government immediately distance itself from Russia's foreign policy agenda. In 2019, Armenia deployed a humanitarian mission to Syria, where Russian forces were supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Three years later, it contributed personnel to the CSTO-led deployment in Kazakhstan. Even today, Armenia continues to host a Russian military base in Gyumri, while Armenian officials insist they have no plans to remove it at the moment. Yerevan also remains active in forums that Moscow promotes as alternatives to Western-led institutions, including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In July 2025, Armenia came close to obtaining full membership in the SCO, but its accession was reportedly blocked by Pakistan’s veto.

Economic ties are even more revealing. Russia remains Armenia's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $12 billion in 2024. Much of that growth reflects Armenia's role as a hub for parallel imports and the re-export of Western goods to the Russian market despite existing sanctions. In December 2023, Armenian authorities signed an agreement with Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom to modernize the Metsamor nuclear power plant and extend its operational lifespan until 2036. If Armenia’s prime minister is genuinely committed to reducing his country's dependence on Russia, such a decision is difficult to reconcile with that objective.

A complex reality

Another factor to consider is that Pashinyan's own rhetoric further complicates the notion of a decisive break with Moscow. Presenting his party's election program, he declared that 'it is difficult to overestimate the importance of our relations with Russia' and vowed not to allow attempts to damage them. During a campaign stop in Lori, he described his relationship with Putin as 'truly friendly,' noting that the two leaders had spoken by phone more than 200 times over the years. Other Armenian officials have reinforced the message, assuring Moscow that Yerevan has no plans to adopt an anti-Russian foreign policy.

Nor is it clear that the Kremlin wants to see Pashinyan lose. An opposition victory, coupled with a refusal to accommodate Azerbaijani demands, could derail the fragile normalization process and reignite tensions between the two countries before a peace treaty is signed. Such an outcome would place Moscow in an uncomfortable position. With its military resources still heavily committed to Ukraine, Russia could once again prove unable or unwilling to come to Armenia's aid, further undermining its credibility in a country where public perceptions of Moscow, while still well below pre-2020 levels, have shown signs of recovery since the 2024 survey. Therefore, the Kremlin may welcome a weakened Pashinyan, but not necessarily a political landscape from which he disappears altogether.

The Kremlin may welcome a weakened Pashinyan, but not necessarily a political landscape from which he disappears altogether

Russian-Armenian relations are clearly no longer what they were before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Moscow's failure to meet Armenian security expectations has weakened a relationship that for decades rested on a pronounced imbalance of power. Yet viewing Armenia's choices through the prism of a simple Russia-versus-West dichotomy risks missing the broader picture. Yerevan may seek closer ties with the EU, welcome greater Western involvement in the South Caucasus, and reassess aspects of its long-standing partnership with Moscow. It has little interest, however, in abandoning one geopolitical orbit for another.