Since 2024, the Belarusian regime has released several groups of political prisoners. On the one hand, their freedom is great news. But negotiations with the regime about new prisoner releases also risk legitimizing Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s hostage diplomacy, writes Victoria Leukavets, post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES).
Released human rights defender Valiantsin Stefanovich gestures after arriving in Vilnius after a prisoner release from Belarus on March 19, 2026. Photo: ANP / Petras Malukas / AFP
The most recent wave of prisoner releases in Belarus marks the largest single release of political detainees since the crackdown that followed the 2020 protests. For many observers, this is an unambiguous humanitarian development: dozens of individuals, widely regarded as unjustly imprisoned, have regained their freedom. At the same time, the scale and timing of the release point to a persistent strategic dilemma.
While relief and solidarity dominate the immediate reaction, the broader implications—how and why these releases take place—remain contested among policymakers, analysts, and Belarusian actors in exile. The central issue is not whether these individuals should have been freed, but whether the mechanism that secured their release creates incentives for further repression.
Moving towards hostage diplomacy
The freeing of political prisoners in March this year is not an isolated episode. Since 2024, the Belarusian regime has carried out repeated waves of pardons which at first took place without external mediation, pointing to an effort by Minsk to test Western reactions. These initial steps appeared calibrated: limited in scope, selective in targets, and timed to gauge whether they would produce any shift in Western diplomatic posture.
From autumn 2025 onward, the picture changed. Interlocutors such as John Coale—the United States’ special envoy responsible for Belarus—became associated with backchannel engagement, indicating a more structured phase of contacts between Minsk and Western actors. The releases began to look less like unilateral gestures and more like part of a broader exchange, where humanitarian steps were increasingly tied to political signaling and expectations on both sides.
From autumn 2025 onward, the picture changed
In this context, under Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the Belarusian regime has increasingly treated political prisoners as instruments in external relations. This reflects a logic often described as ‘hostage diplomacy’ whereby authoritarian governments detain individuals, not solely for domestic repression but also to extract international concessions. While traditionally associated with the detention of foreign nationals, in the Belarusian case this logic has been extended to its own citizens. The implication is clear—individual liberty becomes contingent on geopolitical bargaining.
Strategic calculus: Minsk, Washington, and Moscow
For Minsk, the objectives are straightforward. The Lukashenka regime is seeking to reduce international isolation, restore working contacts with Western governments, and secure at least partial sanctions relief. Prisoner releases are well suited to this purpose. They are highly visible, politically manageable, and easily reversible. These pardons should be treated as a tactical move by the Lukashenka regime—offering just enough to prompt dialogue and signal flexibility to external actors, without altering the repressive dynamics inside the country.
At the same time, these steps are also about positioning Belarus in its relations with both Russia and the West. Since 2020, Aliaksandr Lukashenka has become more reliant on Russia, both politically and economically, reducing his room for manoeuvre in the international arena. Limited and tightly controlled engagement with Western actors provides a way to test whether some flexibility can be regained. The aim is not to change course, but to create additional options.
These pardons should be treated as a tactical move by the Lukashenka regime
The calculus on the U.S. side is also multifaceted. One possible driver is domestic political signaling. Donald Trump has consistently sought to project himself as a successful dealmaker and peacemaker, and tangible outcomes such as prisoner releases align with that narrative. There may also be a more personal or symbolic dimension: the Kushner family traces its roots to Belarus, which could contribute, albeit indirectly, to sustained interest in the country.
In addition to that, the Belarus file cannot be separated from Russia. Vladimir Putin has a clear interest in keeping Belarus stable and firmly aligned with Moscow, especially in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. In this light, U.S. engagement with Minsk is also shaped by Russian signaling. Donald Trump has at times adopted language that mirrors narratives favorable to Moscow, including referring to Aliaksandar Lukashenka in notably positive terms such as ‘honorable’ and ‘highly respected’. This framing points to a broader alignment of the Trump Administration with Russian views on Belarus’s role in regional stability.
Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk, Belarus, January 2025. Photo: Belarus President Press Service Handout / ANP / EPA
From Moscow’s perspective, any easing of sanctions on Belarus—particularly in the financial sector—has practical value because the Belarusian and Russian economies are closely intertwined. Even limited adjustments can create indirect channels through which Russian actors can mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. This may involve rerouting transactions, accessing financial services, or using Belarusian entities as intermediaries to sustain the war effort against Ukraine. In this context, prisoner releases risk becoming part of a wider geopolitical bargain. What appears as a humanitarian development may also serve broader strategic interests that extend beyond Belarus itself.
Recent decisions on sanctions have brought this tension into sharper focus. In the latest round of USA-Belarus talks, American sanctions were eased on entities including Belinvestbank, the Development Bank of Belarus, the Ministry of Finance, and major potash companies such as Belaruskali, Belarusian Potash Company and Agrorozkvit. In addition to that, Lukashenka was invited to Trump´s Peace Council meeting.
Easing sanctions on the listed financial institutions risks providing the Belarusian regime with broader access to U.S. dollar transactions and international debt markets. As these institutions have been implicated in financing the defence-industrial sector, the move could strengthen the economic base of Belarus’s military production and, indirectly, support Russia’s war-related capabilities.
Divided views: humanitarian pragmatism vs strategic caution
Within the policy and analytical community, views on prisoner releases are sharply divided.
One camp prioritizes humanitarian outcomes. The argument is straightforward: if engagement—formal or informal—leads to the release of unjustly detained individuals, it is difficult to oppose it. Given the conditions many prisoners face, including health risks and prolonged isolation, the urgency of securing their release outweighs longer-term considerations.
This position is reflected in the work of the Coalition for the Release of Political Prisoners, established by Valery Kavaleuski, Tatiana Khomich, and Volha Harbunova. The coalition has argued that engagement, including dialogue with the Lukashenka regime, should not be ruled out if it produces concrete results.
A similar position has been expressed by pro-democracy activist Maria Kalesnikava, who spent five years in a Belarusian prison, following her release. In one of her first public statements, including an interview with the Russian blogger Yuri Dud, she called for dialogue with Minsk, noting that her own release became possible because ‘someone started talking to someone’. At the same time, Kavaleuski has emphasized that the coalition operates independently and does not coordinate its work with Kalesnikava.
This camp has also suggested that the European Union should consider a more flexible approach, closer to that of the United States, where engagement is used as a tool to secure humanitarian outcomes.
Within the policy and analytical community, views on prisoner releases are sharply divided
The opposing camp takes a different view. Figures such as president-in-exile Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her office, as well as Pavel Latushka and the National Anti-Crisis Management, focus on the longer-term consequences of engagement. From this perspective, each successful exchange reinforces the logic that detention works as leverage.
Even limited concessions risk encouraging further arrests. The concern is not only about current prisoners, but about the incentives being created for future repression. If the regime learns that detainees can be exchanged for diplomatic or economic benefits, the cycle is likely to continue.
This group also draws a distinction between U.S. and EU approaches. While U.S. engagement may serve a tactical purpose, they argue that the EU should maintain a more consistent pressure line. As Tsikhanouskaya has consistently put it, Europe should remain the ‘bad cop’ while the U.S. acts as the ‘good cop’. The purpose of American sanctions is to free individual people, while the European sanctions should aim to free the country.
Breaking the cycle of transactional repression
These differences reflect a broader dilemma. Refusing engagement with the authoritarian regime avoids legitimizing coercive tactics, but it leaves individuals imprisoned, often indefinitely. Engaging can secure releases, but it risks reinforcing the system that produces them, leading to what many analysts have often termed as 'revolving door' of political repression in Belarus.
The precedent is equally important. If Belarus succeeds in using prisoner releases to obtain concessions, this model may be replicated elsewhere. Other authoritarian regimes may adopt similar tactics, treating detainees as bargaining tools in their external relations. Over time, this risks normalizing a form of engagement in which human rights violations are not only tolerated, but indirectly incentivized.
Other authoritarian regimes may adopt similar tactics
A more sustainable approach would require reframing the terms of engagement. Rather than linking concessions to individual releases, international actors could emphasize structural benchmarks: the cessation of arbitrary detentions, legal reforms, and access for independent monitoring. This would shift the focus from episodic outcomes to systemic change, reducing the incentive to generate new prisoners as bargaining assets.
Equally important is maintaining coordination among external actors. Fragmented responses—where different countries pursue separate channels of engagement—risk undermining collective leverage and enabling the regime to play interlocutors against each other. A unified stance, even if imperfect, can help mitigate the risks of unintended concessions.
No simple solution
The recent largest wave of prisoner releases in Belarus is both a humanitarian achievement and a strategic warning. It demonstrates that engagement can deliver results, but also that those results may come with longer-term costs. The challenge for policymakers is to balance two competing priorities: securing the release of those still detained, and avoiding the creation of incentives for further repression.
There is no simple solution to this problem. What is clear, however, is that the current approach carries risks. If prisoner releases continue to be linked—explicitly or implicitly—to concessions, the system is likely to persist. Breaking that cycle will require a more coordinated and carefully calibrated response, one that addresses not only individual cases but the broader logic that sustains them.
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